Britain is now the centre of civilisation. Will it always be so? Is our
commercial supremacy decaying or not? Have we begun to reach the period
of inevitable decline? Or is decline indeed inevitable at all? Might a
nation go on being great for ever? If so, are _we_ that nation? If not,
have we yet arrived at the moment when retrogression becomes a foregone
conclusion? These are momentous questions. Dare I try, under the mimosas
on the terrace, to resolve them?
Most people have talked of late as though the palmy days of England were
fairly over. The down grade lies now before us. But, then, so far as I
can judge, most people have talked so ever since the morning when
Hengist and Horsa, Limited, landed from their three keels in the Isle of
Thanet. Gildas is the oldest historian of these islands, and his work
consists entirely of a good old Tory lament in the Ashmead-Bartlett
strain upon the degeneracy of the times and the proximate ruin of the
British people. Gildas wrote some fourteen hundred years ago or
thereabouts--and the country is not yet quite visibly ruined. On the
contrary, it seems to the impartial eye a more eligible place of
residence to-day than in the stirring times of the Saxon invasion.
Hence, for the last two or three centuries, I have learned to discount
these recurrent Jeremiads of Toryism, and to judge the question of our
decadence or progress by a more rational standard.
There is only one such rational standard; and that is, to discover the
causes and conditions of our commercial prosperity, and then to inquire
whether those causes and conditions are being largely altered or
modified by the evolution of new phases. If they are, England must begin
to decline; if they are not, her day is not yet come. Home Rule she will
survive; even the Eight Hours bogey, we may presume, will not finally
dispose of her.
Now, the centre of civilisation is not a fixed point. It has varied from
time to time, and may yet vary. In the very earliest historical period,
there was hardly such a thing as a centre of civilisation at all. There
were civilisations in Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Etruria; discrete
civilisations of the river valleys, mostly, which scarcely came into
contact with one another in their first beginnings; any more than our
own came into contact once with the civilisations of China, of Japan, of
Peru, of Mexico. As yet there was no world-commerce, no mutual
communication of empire with empire. It was in the **** and the eastern
basin of the Mediterranean that navigation first reached the point where
great commercial ports and free intercourse became possible. The
Phoenicians, and later the Greeks, were the pioneers of the new era.
Tyre, Athens, Miletus, Rhodes, occupied the centre of the nascent world,
and bound together Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece,
Sicily, and Italy in one mercantile system. A little later, Hellas
itself enlarged, so as to include Syracuse, Byzantium, Alexandria,
Cyrene, Cumae, Neapolis, Massilia. The inland sea became "a Greek lake."
But as navigation thus slowly widened to the western Mediterranean
basin, the centre of commerce had to shift perforce from Hellas to the
mid-point of the new area. Two powerful trading towns occupied such a
mid-point in the Mediterranean--Rome and Carthage; and they were driven
to fight out the supremacy of the world (the world as it then existed)
between them. With the Roman Empire, the circle extended so as to take
in the Atlantic coasts, Gaul, Spain, and Britain, which then, however,
lay not at the centre but on the circumference of civilisation. During
the Middle Ages, when navigation began to embrace the great open sea as
well as the Mediterranean, a double centre sprang up: the Italian
Republics, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Pisa, were still the chief carriers;
but the towns of Flanders, Bruges, Ghent, and Antwerp began to compete
with them, and the Atlantic states, France, England, the Low Countries,
rose into importance. By and by, as time goes on, the discoveries of
Columbus and of Vasco di Gama open out new tracks. Suddenly commerce is
revolutionised. France, England, Spain, become nearer to America and
India than Italy; so Italy declines; while the Atlantic states usurp the
first place as the centres of civilisation.
Our own age brings fresh seas into the circle once more. It is no longer
the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Indian Ocean that alone count;
the Pacific also begins to be considered. China, Japan, the Cape; Chili,
Peru, the Argentine; California, British Columbia, Australia, New
Zealand; all of them are parts of the system of to-day; civilisation is
world-wide.
Has this change of area altered the central position of England? Not at
all, save to strengthen it. If you look at the hemisphere of greatest
land, you will see that England occupies its exact middle. Insular
herself, and therefore all made up of ports, she is nearer all ports in
the world than any other country is or ever can be. I don't say that
this insures for her perpetual dominion, such as Virgil prophesied for
the Roman Empire; but I do say it makes her a hard country to beat in
commercial competition. It accounts for Liverpool, London, Glasgow,
Newcastle; it even accounts in a way for Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds,
and Sheffield. England now stands at the mathematical centre of the
practical world, and unless some Big Thing occurs to displace her, she
must continue to stand there. It takes a great deal to upset the balance
of an entire planet.
Is anything now displacing her? Well, there is the fact that railways
are making land-carriage to-day more important relatively to
water-carriage than at any previous period. That may, perhaps, in time
shift the centre of the world from an island like England to the middle
of a great land area, like Chicago or Moscow. And, no doubt, if ever the
centre shifts at all, it will shift towards Western America, or rather
the prairie region. But, just at present, what are the greatest
commercial towns of the world? All ports to a man. And the day when it
will be otherwise, if ever, seems still far distant. Look at the newest
countries. What are their great focal points? Every one of them ports.
Melbourne and Sydney; Rio, Buenos Ayres, and Valparaiso; Cape Town, San
Francisco, Bombay, Calcutta, Yokohama. Chicago itself, the most vital
and the quickest grower among modern towns, owes half its importance to
the fact that there water-carriage down the Great Lakes begins; though
it owes the other half, I admit, to the converse fact that all the great
trans-continental railways have to bend south at that point to avoid
Lake Michigan. Still, on the whole, I think, as long as conditions
remain what they are, the commercial supremacy of England is in no
immediate danger. It is these great permanent geographical factors that
make or mar a country, not Eight Hours Bills or petty social
reconstructions. Said the Lord Mayor of London to petulant King James,
when he proposed to remove the Court to Oxford, "May it please your
Majesty not to take away the Thames also."
"But our competitors? We are being driven out of our markets." Oh, yes,
if that's all you mean, I don't suppose we shall always be able in
everything to keep up our exclusive position. Our neighbours, who (bar
the advantage of insularity, which means a coast and a port always close
at hand) seem nearly as well situated as we are for access to the
world-markets, are beginning to wake up and take a slice of the cake
from us. Germany is manufacturing; Belgium is smelting; Antwerp is
exporting; America is occupying her own markets. But that's a very
different thing indeed from national decadence. We may have to compete a
little harder with our rivals, that's all. The Boom may be over; but the
Thames remains: the geographical facts are still unaltered. And notice
that all the time while there's been this vague talk about "bad
times"--income-tax has been steadily increasing, London has been
steadily growing, every outer and visible sign of commercial prosperity
has been steadily spreading. Have our watering-places shrunk? Have our
buildings been getting smaller and less luxurious? If Antwerp has grown,
how about Hull and Cardiff? "Well, perhaps the past is all right; but
consider the future! Eight hours are going to drive capital out of the
country!" Rubbish! I'm not a political economist, thank God; I never
sank quite so low as that. And I'm not speaking for or against Eight
Hours: I'm only discounting some verbose nonsense. But I know enough to
see that the capital of a country can no more be exported than the land
or the houses. Can you drive away the London and North-Western Railway?
Can you drive away the factories of Manchester, the mines of the Black
Country, the canals, the buildings, the machinery, the docks, the plant,
the apparatus? Impossible, on the very face of it! Most of the capital
of a country is fixed in its soil, and can't be uprooted. People fall
into this error about driving away capital because they know you can
sell particular railway shares or a particular factory and leave the
country with the proceeds, provided somebody else is willing to buy; but
you can't sell all the railways and all the factories in a lump, and
clear out with the capital. No, no; England stands where she does,
because God put her there; and until He invents a new order of things
(which may, of course, happen any day--as, for example, if aerial
navigation came in) she must continue, in spite of minor changes, to
maintain in the main her present position.
But a truce to these frivolities! The little Italian boy next door calls
me to play ball with him, with a green lemon from the garden. Vengo,
Luigi, vengo! I return at once to the realities of life, and dismiss
such shadows.